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RECENT CASES

under one set of circumstances may not be reasonable under another. Thus,
disputes would be promoted and the result would be an increase in litigation. Therefore, if there is to be any revision of the rule it should be by
legislative action. The common law rule against perpetuities, without material
alteration, is in force in about two-thirds of the statesf California has adopted
by statute the rule already in existence by virtue of a constitutional provision.1 0
North Dakota has no statute against perpetuities, although there are statutory
restraints on alienation. There was some indication in In re Gray's Estate"
that the law in North Dakota included a rule against remoteness in vesting;
however, since the decision in Anderson v. Blixt,12 it is certain that no such
rule exists here.
JAKE C. HODNY
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In 1954 defendant forced plaintiff's car off the highway

killing plaintiff's wife and child. Defendant did not stop at the scene of the
accident, nor did he report the incident to authorities as required by statute.,
Plaintiff learned defendant's identity in 1956 and filed suit the same year.
Defendant pleaded the one year statute of limitations2 for wrongful death
actions. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the cause of action accrued
at the time of the death and was not tolled under the general statutory
provisions for fraudulent concealment or other improper acts.3: Frazee v. Partney, 314 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1958).
A cause of action for wrongful death is a statutory creation having its
origin in England in 1846. 4 The first wrongful death statute in the United
States was passed by New York in 1847,5 and we now have similar enactments
in all the states.6
Every state has a time limitation for commencing action for wrongful death,

9. Smith, Real Property Survey, c. 9 h (10)
(1956).
10. Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 125 Cal. App.2d 222, 270 P.2d 604 (1954)
(Section 715.2 of the Civil Code, provides as follows: "No interest in real or personal
,property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved
in the situation to which the limitation applies.
).
11. 27 N.D. 417, 146 N.W. 722 (1914).
12. 72 N.W.2d 799 (N.D. 1955)
(The lease involved agricultural land with an
option to purchase, and' was to continue as long as any one of th I'sso-s was alive or
until the option was exercised. It was contended that § 47-1602 of the N. Dak. Rev. Code
(1943)
was a rule against perpetuities, therefore the lease was invalid. The court held
that there was no statutory or common law rule against perpetuities in force in North
Dakota.).
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 564.450 (1949)
(Provides no person involved in an accident
while operating a vehicle on a highway shall leave scene wthout stopping and giving
personal information to injured party or police officer.).
2. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.100 (1949) ("Every action . . . shall be commenced within
one year after the cause of action shall accrue . . .").
3. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.280 (1949)
("If any person, by absconding or concealing
himself, or by any other improper act, prevent the commencement of an action, such
action may be commenced within the time herein limited, after the commencement of
such action shall have ceased to' be so prevented.").
4. Lord Campbell's Act 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).
5. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1847, c. 450, §§ 1 & 2.
See also Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed.
92 (2d Cir. 1921).
6. 11 Blashfield, Cyc. Auto Law & Pr. § 7412 (Penn. ed. 1936).
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varying from one to six years.7 No states were found that specifically provided
for a tolling of the time limitation where a defendant concealed his identity.
Therefore the question in cases such as the instant one is whether wrongful
death statutes are tolled under provisions for tolling the general statute of
limitations.
The majority of states and the federal courts hold that circumstances which
toll the general statute of limitations, either expressly or by implication, will
not toll the limitations period in a wrongful death statute, in the absence of
a savings clause to that effect.1 These courts reason that a provision relating
to the time an action must be commenced constitutes a part of the substance
of the right to maintain such action. 9 The minority view holds that the provision in the statute is a limitation upon the remedy and not upon the right
to the action. 10
Where a statute requires a motorist involved in an accident to make a
report to a public agency, there is further split of authority. While decisions
are not numerous, they appear to be resonant in holding that such a statute
dispenses with any other efforts required on the part of a deceased party's
administrator to discover a tortfeasor in regards to the expiration of a time
limitation period for wrongful death actions." The basis for this reasoning is
that a statute to give notice is enacted to provide opportunities to seek compensation. 12 Therefore, the time period does not begin to run until the
i3
defendant's identity is discovered.
The decision in the instant case stated that the court was forced to construe
the "cold, clear words" of the statute, whereby in the absence of a special
tolling provision to the wrongful death statute, tolling provisions to the
general statute of limitations could not apply; any future remedy would be
legislative, not judicial. It is questionable that the legislative intent was for
such a strict construction when they also provided that a motorist leaving
the scene of an accident in which he is involved without reporting information
14
about himself to the other party or authorities, is guilty of a felony.

7. Ibid. (Fourteen states have enacted statutes providing actions for wrongful death
must be commenced within one year; twenty-eight have two year provisions; four have
three year provisions; and two have six year provisions.).
8. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921). See, e.g., The Harrisburg,
119 U.S. 199 (1886); Peters v. Public Service Corp., 132 N.J. Eq. 500, 29 A.2d 189
(1942). The Peters' case upheld the rule that commencement of an action was an indispensible condition of liability, but held that equity will not permit defendant to take
advantage of the bar where defendant's wrongful conduct causes plaintiff to delay subjecting his claim to the bar.
9. See, e.g., The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); Rodman v. Missouri Pac. Ry.,
65 Kan. 645, 70 Pac. 642 (1902); Poff v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 72 N. H. 164,
55 Atl. 891 (1903); Lapsley v. Public Service Corp., 75 N.J. L. 480, 68 Atl. 1113
(1908).
10. McDonough v. Cestare, 3 App. Div.2d 201, 159 N. Y. S.2d 616 (1957); Sharrow
v. Inland Lines Ltd., 214 N. Y. 101, 108 N.E. 217 (1915); Brookshire v. Burkhart, 141
Okla. 1, 283 Pac. 571 (1929); Rosenzweig v. Heller, 302 Pa. 279, 153 AtI. 346 (1931).
The Sharrow case decision was the initiate standing for the proposition that the period of
limitation governing wrongful death action in New York is in the nature of a general
statute of limitations.
11. Kurry v. Frost, 214 Ark. 386, 162 S.W.2d 48 (1942); St. Clair v. Bardstown
Transfer Line, 310 Ky. 776, 221 S.W.2d 679 (1949).
12. St. Clair v. Bardstown Transfer Line, supra note 11.
13. Ibid.
14. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 564.450, 564.460 (1949); Hurley v. Edison, 258 S.W.2d 607
(Mo. 1953).
Cf. N. D. Rev. Code §§ 39-0610, 39-0624 (1943) (Provides revocation:
or suspension of license and that the offense is a misdemeanor).
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No cases have been found wherein the North Dakota Supreme Court has
ruled on the question in the instant case. Our courts have indicated that our
15
but Section 1-0201 of
wrongful death statute must be strictly construed,
the 1943 Revised Code states: "The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be construed strictly has no application to this code."
On the foundation provided by this statute and in the public interest, it is
believed that an identity concealing defendant should not be allowed to
benefit by pleading the time limitation for a wrongful death action.
LAWRENCE NAGATOMO.

15. Willard v. Mohn, 24 N. D. 390, 139 N.W. 979 (1913).

